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PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT 2012: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSENT OBLIGATION* 
YIP Man† 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford);  
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore) 
I. Introduction 
1 The Personal Data Protection Act 20121 (“PDPA”) provides the 
baseline standards of protection of personal data and works in tandem with 
existing law to provide comprehensive protection. The birth of the 
legislation clearly signals Singapore’s commitment to protect the collection, 
use and disclosure of personal data in the age of big data and its awareness 
of the importance of such protection in strengthening Singapore’s position 
as a leading commercial hub. Significantly, the PDPA protection model 
balances “both the rights of individuals to protect their personal data” 
against “the needs of organisations to collect, use or disclose personal data 
for legitimate and reasonable purposes”.2 The approach is thus a pragmatic 
one. The legislation does not promise uncurtailed protection of informational 
privacy of the individual, a model that would be practically difficult to 
                                                     
* Any views expressed in this article are the author’s personal views only and 
should not be taken to represent the views of her employer. All errors remain 
the author’s own. 
† Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University; 
DS Lee Foundation Fellow. Yip Man is a Panel Speaker on “Restitution” for 
the Attorney-General’s Chambers’ Professional Development Programme, 
the Asia Pacific Digest Editor for the Restitution Law Review and a 
co-Administrator of the Singapore Law Blog. She previously served as a 
member of the Singapore Academy of Law Law Reform Committee. 
1 Act 26 of 2012. 
2 Personal Data Protection Commission website <https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/ 
legislation-and-guidelines/overview> (accessed 7 January 2017). The word 
“organisation” is defined under s 2(1) of the Personal Data Protection 
Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) to include “any individual, company, association 
or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, whether or not (a) formed or 
recognised under the law of Singapore; or (b) resident, or having an office or a 
place of business, in Singapore”. 
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enforce, as well as lead to the creation of a trade barrier. Nor does 
stringency guarantee better protection in every case.3 
2 This article examines the role and concept of consent under the 
PDPA. It shows that the PDPA does not – and rightly so – overemphasise 
the role of consent in personal data protection. The discussion consists of 
three main parts. First, at a general level, we consider the significance of 
consent in personal data protection from both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. Second, we scrutinise the place of “consent” in the structural 
framework of the PDPA. Finally, we examine recent decisions delivered by 
the Personal Data Protection Commission (“PDPC”) to gain a better 
understanding of the enforcement of the consent obligation in practice. 
II. Theory of consent in personal data protection 
3 Consent is a fundamental legal concept. It is a core requirement of 
many legal activities, such as the formation of contract, the creation of trust 
and the transfer of rights. Conversely, the lack of consent for certain acts 
can lead to legal liability. Consent, as a trigger for a legal event, accords 
respect to individual autonomy. In the context of personal data, consent 
operates as a mechanism of authorisation.4 The requirement of an 
individual’s consent confers control on the individual over the use of his 
personal data by others. 
4 Accordingly, consent should play an important role in any personal 
data protection legislation. Yet, the theory of consent presupposes that the 
individual is always able to make a voluntary, informed choice. Consent in 
practice is likely to present a different picture. It has been forcefully argued 
that “an overemphasis of autonomous authorisation” will lead to an 
overload of consent transactions5 with the consequence that consumers 
suffer from “consent fatigue” and “consent desensitisation”, thereby 
ultimately weakening the consent mechanism as an effective way of seeking 
                                                     
3 See Bart Willem Schermer et al, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal 
Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection” (2014) 16 Ethics 
and Information Technology 171. 
4 See Bart Willem Schermer et al, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal 
Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection” (2014) 16 Ethics 
and Information Technology 171 at 174–175. 
5 This problem is particularly acute in the context of Internet activities. 
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voluntary, intentional and informed authorisation.6 Alternative models have 
thus been proposed, including paternalism (banning certain kinds of 
dealings with personal data); making privacy notices more reasonable and 
accessible to ensure informed and voluntary choices;7 and a differentiated 
consent model where the type of consent required is based on the severity of 
risks/dangers associated with the particular kind of transaction.8 
5 Further, the role (and degree of emphasis) of consent within the 
regulatory framework should be assessed by considering the other interests 
that are worth protecting. An overemphasis on consent in personal data 
protection law would undoubtedly lead to higher compliance costs for 
businesses and slower transaction rates. These consequences would affect 
both organisations as well as individuals. Beyond purely economic 
consequences, organisations may require an individual’s personal data for 
legitimate and/or reasonable activities. To accord full control to individuals 
in deciding whether their personal data may be collected, used or disclosed 
can have serious impact upon the functioning of social and legal 
relationships. 
6 Next, we turn to examine the role and concept of consent under the 
PDPA. The analysis shows that the Singapore protection model does not 
overly emphasise consent. Instead, it embodies a balancing approach that 
incorporates principles of necessity, reasonableness and fairness. 
                                                     
6 Bart Willem Schermer et al, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal 
Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection” (2014) 16 Ethics 
and Information Technology 171 at 176–179. 
7 Aleecia M McDonald & Tom Lowenthal, “Nano-notice: Privacy Disclosure at 
a Mobile Scale” (2013) 3 Journal of Information Policy 331. 
8 Bart Willem Schermer et al, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal 
Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection” (2014) 16 Ethics 
and Information Technology 171. 
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III. Role and concept of consent under the Personal Data 
Protection Act 
A. Concept of consent 
7 As a general rule, the PDPA prescribes that an organisation requires 
consent from the individual to collect, use or disclose personal data relating 
to that individual. Section 13 of the PDPA provides as follows: 
An organisation shall not, on or after the appointed day, collect, use or 
disclose personal data about an individual unless — 
(a) the individual gives, or is deemed to have given, his consent 
under this Act to the collection, use or disclosure, as the case 
may be; or 
(b) the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be, without the 
consent of the individual is required or authorised under this Act 
or any other written law. 
[emphasis added] 
8 Relevantly, the meaning of “consent” is not defined in the PDPA. 
This may raise concerns of uncertainty. However, there is ample guidance 
under the PDPA when one turns to look at other provisions. Valid consent 
can only be obtained from an individual, as a general rule, if the individual 
has been notified of the purposes for the collection, use or disclosure 
pursuant to s 20.9 Section 14 provides that consent that is obtained 
pursuant to deceptive or misleading practices is invalid. Clearly, both s 14 
and s 20 are inserted to ensure that consent is given on an informed basis. 
Another limit, imposed by s 18(2), is that personal data may only be 
collected, used or disclosed for purposes “that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances”.10 Section 11(1) further clarifies 
that “[i]n meeting its responsibilities under this Act, an organisation shall 
consider what a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the 
circumstances”. The lack of definition is not always a shortcoming: it 
affords latitude for deciding on a “case-by-case” basis and enables the PDPA 
to better respond to future technological advancements. 
                                                     
9 See ss 14(1)(a) and 18(b) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 
of 2012). 
10 This means that appropriateness of purpose is determined objectively. 
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9 Section 13 also makes clear that consent may be deemed. 
Section 15(1) of the PDPA provides that there is deemed consent by an 
individual to the collection, use or disclosure of his personal data by an 
organisation for a purpose if the individual “voluntarily provides the 
personal data to the organisation for that purpose”11 or it is reasonable that 
he would do so voluntarily.12 Section 15(2) continues to provide that if an 
individual has consented or is deemed to have consented to an organisation 
disclosing his personal data to another organisation for a particular purpose, 
the individual is deemed to have consented to the disclosure of the data for 
that particular purpose by the other (receiving) organisation. Of course, the 
concept of deemed consent is subject to the limitations imposed by s 18 
discussed above, namely, notification of purpose as well as reasonableness of 
purpose. 
10 As a matter of principle, “deemed consent” is not actual consent and 
may seemingly undercut the control which the PDPA confers upon an 
individual over the collection, use or disclosure of his personal data. 
However, in practice, “deemed consent” is a cost-effective means for 
organisations to obtain authorisation. “Deemed consent” may also benefit 
the individual in terms of transactional efficiency, as it can reduce consent 
requests and avoid an overload of consent transactions. Besides, the concept 
of “deemed consent” is properly circumscribed in the PDPA. Where the 
individual voluntarily supplies personal data to an organisation for a 
purpose, it is generally fair and reasonable for the individual to be treated as 
having consented to the collection, use and disclosure of the personal data 
by the organisation for that purpose. For example, a patient who supplies 
his personal data to a medical clinic for the purpose of making a medical 
appointment would be deemed to have consented to the medical clinic’s 
collection or use of his personal data for the purpose of seeking medical 
treatment.13 It may even be said that consent could be inferred in such 
circumstances. 
11 Greater uncertainty may arise in respect of s 15(1)(b) – “it is 
reasonable that the individual would voluntarily provide the data”. But 
                                                     
11 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 15(1)(a). 
12 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 15(1)(b). 
13 Kah Leng Ter, “Information Management: Towards Consumer Data 
Protection Legislation in Singapore” (2012) 24 SAcLJ 143 at 163. 
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individuals need not be overly concerned. First, the burden of proof rests on 
organisations to show that there is deemed consent. Secondly, whether the 
individual would have voluntarily provided the personal data is a matter to 
be assessed objectively. Thirdly, the concept of deemed consent is subject to 
the s 18 limitations.14 The clearest example of deemed consent under 
s 15(1)(b) would be where a patient seeks or agrees to a referral by his 
family doctor to a specialist for further medical treatment. For that purpose, 
the personal information relating to the individual will need to be disclosed 
to the specialist clinic and consent for disclosure could be deemed in such 
circumstances. 
12 Finally, s 16 of the PDPA provides that consent (including deemed 
consent) may be withdrawn.15 The withdrawal of consent operates 
prospectively: it does not render the prior collection, use or disclosure of 
personal data unauthorised. The provision for withdrawal of consent 
provides further control to the individual to decide how his personal data 
may be used and such control is particularly crucial in situations of deemed 
consent. 
B. Exceptions 
13 Section 13(b) provides that the consent of the individual is not 
required in circumstances where the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
data is statutorily mandated or authorised. We will focus on statutory 
authorisation under the PDPA. But before that, it should not be missed 
that s 4(5) of the PDPA excludes from the scope of Pts III–VI “business 
contact information”16 that is not expressly referred to therein. This 
exclusion is defensible on two grounds. First, business contact information, 
in most cases, is publicly available information.17 Secondly, business contact 
information should not be considered personal data, as it is generated in 
                                                     
14 It is less clear how the notification obligation is to be satisfied in respect of 
s 15(1)(b) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012). 
15 Note s 16(4) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012). 
16 See the definition under s 2(1) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 
(Act 26 of 2012). 
17 Exempted under para 1(c) of the Second Schedule (collection); para 1(c) of the 
Third Schedule (use); and para 1(d) of the Fourth Schedule (disclosure) to the 
Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012). 
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connection with and for professional objectives. The point of business 
contact information is to enable others to contact the individual for 
professional reasons. 
14 More significantly, section 17 of the PDPA provides that personal 
data can be collected, used and disclosed without consent in the 
circumstances set out in the Second Schedule (collection), Third Schedule 
(use) and Fourth Schedule (disclosure). These exceptions are generally 
characterised by necessity, reasonableness and/or fairness. Essentially, the 
PDPA acknowledges that certain forms of socially, morally or legally 
acceptable uses of personal data do not require the individual’s consent.18 
It has been pointed out that some of the exemptions appear to be very 
wide,19 for instance, collection necessary for “evaluative purposes”20 and 
where the personal data is publicly available.21 It must nevertheless be borne 
in mind that an effective control of any form of potential statutory 
excessiveness is the interpretation and application of the PDPA provisions 
by adjudicating bodies. 
IV. Personal Data Protection Commission decisions 
15 The PDPC’s decisions on alleged breaches of the consent obligation 
will be examined in this Part. A number of key points may be drawn from 
the decisions. 
                                                     
18 Some of these exceptions may overlap with the concept of deemed consent. 
See, eg, para 1(n) of the Second Schedule to the Personal Data Protection 
Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012). 
19 Hannah Lim Yee Fen, “The Data Protection Paradigm for the Tort of Privacy 
in the Age of Big Data” (2015) 27 SAcLJ 789 at 819–820. 
20 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Second Schedule, 
para 1(f). Also see para 1(f) of the Third Schedule and para 1(h) of the 
Fourth Schedule. See the definition of “evaluative purposes” under s 2(1). 
21 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Second Schedule, 
para 1(c); Third Schedule, para 1(c); Fourth Schedule, para 1(d). 
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A. Consent 
16 The PDPC does not generally object to broadly-worded consent 
requests22 or opt-out provisions.23 The question in each case is whether the 
relevant provision is effective in seeking consent from the individual in 
relation to the collection, use or disclosure of his personal data for the 
relevant purpose. Clear and internally consistent drafting is crucial. In the 
“absence of clear supporting evidence”, the PDPC would, out of prudence, 
refrain from making a finding of breach.24 
17 Further, the PDPC does not interpret the concept of “deemed 
consent” under s 15 widely. In Universal Travel Corp Pte Ltd,25 four 
passengers sought from the tour agency formal confirmation of cancellation 
of their flight for the purpose of processing their insurance claims. The tour 
agency disclosed to each of the four passengers the affected passenger list 
which contained the four passengers’ personal data. The PDPC held that 
the four passengers could not be deemed to have consented to the 
disclosure, as each passenger only required his own personal information for 
the purpose of processing his insurance claim. It was also possible, in the 
circumstances, for the personal data of the relevant passenger to be released 
to that passenger alone. Nothing on the facts suggested urgency that would 
necessitate the dispensation of consent under para 1(a) of the Fourth 
Schedule to the PDPA. 
B. Neighbouring obligations 
18 The PDPC also emphasised the independence and importance of the 
“neighbouring obligations”26 – the notification obligation and the 
reasonableness of purpose obligation under s 18. The PDPC’s approach 
underscores that the PDPA protection framework is not based solely on 
consent. In particular, the PDPC said that the reasonableness obligation is 
“an important aspect of the PDPA as it is effective in addressing excesses in 
the collection, use or disclosure of personal data” under a broadly-worded 
                                                     
22 See AIA Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] SGPDPC 10 at [11]–[12]. 
23 See YesTuition Agency [2016] SGPDPC 5. 
24 AIA Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] SGPDPC 10 at [12]. 
25 [2016] SGPDPC 4. 
26 Jump Rope (Singapore) [2016] SGPDPC 21 at [10]. 
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consent clause.27 Even if an organisation is not to have breached the consent 
obligation, it may be guilty of breaching the neighbouring obligations.28 
19 Interestingly, in Jump Rope (Singapore),29 the PDPC said that in 
exceptional circumstances, it may be reasonable for an organisation to 
disclose personal data of an individual without consent.30 Such 
circumstances include the disclosure of personal data of an individual who 
has been dismissed, blacklisted or undergoing disciplinary proceedings for 
the purpose of warning others. However, the PDPC said that the 
organisation must comply with the neighbouring obligations. 
C. Exceptions 
20 In My Digital Lock Pte Ltd,31 the PDPC considered the “publicly 
available data”, the “necessary for investigations and proceedings” and the 
“necessary for provision of legal services” exceptions under the Fourth 
Schedule to the PDPA. In respect of the latter two exceptions, the PDPC 
stressed that the organisation must show necessity and the disclosure would 
not be considered necessary for those objectives if there are other ways of 
achieving the same.32 
D. Enforcement actions 
21 In determining the appropriate enforcement actions to be ordered 
pursuant to s 29 of the PDPA, the PDPC takes into account a broad range 
of considerations. The decisions on breach of the consent obligation 
concerned unauthorised disclosure and the relevant considerations are: 
(a) the number of third parties to whom the disclosure has been 
made; 
(b) the period of disclosure; 
(c) the amount of personal data disclosed; 
                                                     
27 AIA Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] SGPDPC 10 at [18]. 
28 AIA Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] SGPDPC 10 at [19]. 
29 [2016] SGPDPC 21. 
30 Jump Rope (Singapore) [2016] SGPDPC 21 at [10]. See also [11] (where 
notification may be dispensed with). 
31 [2016] SGPDPC 20. 
32 My Digital Lock Pte Ltd [2016] SGPDPC 20 at [21]. 
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(d) the level of sensitivity of the disclosed personal data; 
(e) the impact of disclosure upon the individual; 
(f) whether the disclosure was caused by wilful or systemic failures 
of the organisation; 
(g) whether the organisation has taken proactive correction 
procedures; and 
(h) whether the organisation has been co-operative in the 
investigation. 
22 In less serious cases,33 the PDPC issued merely a warning to make 
clear that breaches of the PDPA are taken seriously. In Universal Travel 
Corp Pte Ltd,34 the PDPC issued directions for extensive remedial steps to 
be taken by the organisation for being in breach of s 12 of the PDPA, but it 
refrained from imposing a fine. In Chua Yong Boon Justin,35 the PDPC 
imposed a $500 fine on the breaching party on account of the fact that the 
breach was wilful.36 However, the PDPC set the fine amount at “the lower 
end of the spectrum” in view of the fact that the disclosure was limited, 
one-off, and did not cause a harmful impact on the individual.37 
V. Conclusion 
23 It has been shown in this article that the PDPA, quite rightly, does 
not overly emphasise the role of consent in personal data protection. It seeks 
to balance the competing interests of the individual and others who may 
wish to or require the use of the individual’s personal data. It does so 
through differentiating the type of consent (actual or deemed) that is 
required based on the risks associated with the transaction and by reference 
to socially and morally acceptable norms. It also dispenses with the consent 
requirement in circumstances that are characterised by necessity, 
reasonableness and/or fairness. Further, the rigours of protection under the 
                                                     
33 See, eg, YesTuition Agency [2016] SGPDPC 5; My Digital Lock Pte Ltd [2016] 
SGPDPC 20 (also in breach of s 24 of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 
(Act 26 of 2012)) and Jump Rope (Singapore) [2016] SGPDPC 21 (also in 
breach of ss 11 and 20). 
34 [2016] SGPDPC 4. 
35 [2016] SGPDPC 13. 
36 Chua Yong Boon Justin [2016] SGPDPC 13 at [19(c)]. 
37 Chua Yong Boon Justin [2016] SGPDPC 13 at [21]. 
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PDPA are not (and cannot be) secured by the consent obligation alone. 
Other neighbouring obligations, such as the notification and reasonableness 
of purpose obligations, are also central to the regulatory framework. 
 
